A few questions regarding background for the course:

1. I am curious about about the current status of the mind/body problem. This is the way it was presented to me:

	Functionalism does not really solve the problem,
	Neuroscience has rejected the possibility of an identity theory, and
	Epiphenomenalism is effectively a non-answer.

	Therefore, elimitivism is the only recourse for a materialist.

Now, this is obviously a very Churchlandian argument, but how accurate is it? It certainly smells funny.

2. Along the same vein, I realize that type-type identity does not appear to fit with our understanding of neuroscience, but what about token-token identity? Dretske mentions it in our readings for this week as if it were a viable theory scientifically. Is it?

3. My information regarding the status of scientific findings are a bit outdated. Have there been any recent (the last 4-5 years) findings in cognitive science or neuroscience that are relevant to our philosophical concerns?

I realize that all of these questions have a similar focus. They stem from a curiousity about the scientific side of the issues we are discussing.